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ELECTRONIC PITFALLS: THE ONLINE MODIFICATION OF ONGOING CONSUMER
SERVICE AGREEMENTS
Ben Casady1
©Ben Casady
Abstract
This Article examines the procedure for online modification of an ongoing consumer
contract. It reviews the relevant case law, including Douglas v. U.S. District Court, a recent
Ninth Circuit decision that calls into question the validity of changing contractual terms by
merely posting the changes on the service provider’s Web site. The Article also examines
the discrete components found in an effective online contract modification and provides
practical pointers for contract drafters.
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INTRODUCTION
Perhaps now more than ever, Americans find themselves in long-term contractual relationships
with their service providers.2  The average American may have an ongoing consumer service
agreement (a “CSA”) with a cell phone provider, long-distance telephone carrier, cable or
satellite television provider, and one or more credit card issuers. Many of these relationships
are managed in whole or part through Web sites that permit service subscribers to view their
account activity, manage the level of service received, and pay outstanding balances.
Service providers tend to change the terms of their CSAs from time to time, and the prospect
of announcing such changes through their Web sites is an attractive, cost-effective option.
Douglas v. U.S. District Court, however, a recent opinion from the Ninth Circuit, should serve
as a reminder to service providers that certain protocols must be followed for online
modifications to consumer contracts to be upheld.3  This Article will first briefly discuss the law
applicable to the modification of service contracts. Next, it will examine Douglas within the
broader context of the basic underpinnings of contract modification. Finally, the article will
provide practice pointers to assist drafters in preparing valid online contract modifications.
AN OPENING QUESTION: DOES FEDERAL LAW OR STATE LAW APPLY
Federal law regulates many of the industries that routinely rely on consumer service
agreements. Yet, at least when it comes to the modification of CSAs, state contract law will
typically determine whether a modification is valid. This is true in the case of credit card
agreements,4  wireless communications agreements,5  and cable television services contracts.6
For example, with respect to long distance telephone CSAs, the Seventh Circuit has held that
the Federal Communications Act (“FCA”) preempts state law in regards to the terms of long-
distance CSAs.7  By contrast, the Ninth Circuit has held that the 2001 detariffing8  of long- 1
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distance carriers requires that state contract law be applied to long-distance CSAs.9  This view
is supported by pre-detariffing decisions in the Second and Sixth Circuits.10  Indeed, the
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) itself has stated that “consumers may have
remedies under state consumer protection and contract laws as to issues regarding the legal
relationship between the carrier and customer . . . .”11  Addtionally, a number of cases also
consider the Federal Arbitration Act,12  which is commonly implicated in such cases, where
modification of a CSA involves the imposition or enforcement of arbitration provisions.13
Given the trend in applying state contract law to long-distance service contracts, lawyers in
this field, like those dealing with the wireless, television, or credit industries, should heed
relevant state contract law when drafting contract modifications. However, while state contract
law may control in many instances, other laws may be applicable depending on the particular
agreement clause involved.
OVERVIEW OF PERTINENT CONTRACT LAW FOR AMENDING THE TERMS OF CONSUMER SERVICE
AGREEMENTS
The Douglas Court examined the validity of using a Web site to inform consumers of a change
in the terms of their CSAs. The critical issue in Douglas was whether the binding arbitration
provision of the CSA at issue was enforceable against the consumer in spite of the fact that
the arbitration provision was the result of an online modification.14  The Ninth Circuit, applying
California state contract law, implicitly held that the procedures employed by Talk America did
not provide its subscribers with proper notice of the new terms and the online modification
was, therefore, unenforceable.15
To understand the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Douglas, it is necessary to first discuss the basic
underpinnings of contract modification law. Although contract law varies from state to state,
three factors have near-universal relevance for contract modification: first, the contract must
be amenable to change; second, consent to the modification is required; and third, proper
notice of the change in terms must be given for the consumer’s consent to be effective. As
noted, the central issue in the Douglas case implicates the third factor: does simply posting an
updated contract on a Web site constitute proper notice? Each of these three factors will be
examined below.
The Contract Must Be Amenable to Change
CSAs typically contain a provision enabling the service provider to change the terms of the
contract from time to time.16  But some courts have found that, even with such ‘change of
terms’ provisions, unilateral contract modifications should be limited to subject matters
contemplated in the original contract. 17  One California court, for instance, found that the
terms in a bankcard CSA, which only referenced fees, percentage rates, methods of calculating
account balances, and the like, did not alert customers the possibility that a ‘change of terms’
provision would empower the bank to “terminate its customers’ right to have disputes resolved
in the civil justice system” by adding an arbitration clause.18  In response to such types of
cases, Delaware has enacted statutes that permit the addition of terms that were not
necessarily contemplated in the original contract.19  In all other states, however, drafters of
new CSAs should consider referencing the possibility that the service provider’s dispute
resolution policies might be modified, even if the CSA as written will not contain a dispute
resolution policy.
Consent to Modification Is Required
By changing the terms of a CSA, the service provider is essentially offering a new contract.20
To minimize the likelihood of the terms being found non-binding, the service provider should
give the consumer a chance to accept or reject the contract.21  Generally, the service provider
can structure the offer so that the consumer accepts the change in terms by continuing to use
the service. Conversely, the offer can be structured so that the consumer’s rejection of the
modification comes by quitting the service without penalty.22
An example of a court approving of a consumer’s acceptance-through-continued-use and non-
2
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cancellation of the service can be found in Boomer v. AT&T Corp.23  In that case, the appellant
argued that he had no opportunity to reject defendant service provider’s CSA. The court held
that language in the proffered CSA gave the plaintiff ample opportunity to reject the offer; the
contract stated that “IF YOU DO NOT AGREE TO THESE . . . TERMS AND CONDITIONS, DO
NOT USE THE SERVICES, AND CANCEL THE SERVICES IMMEDIATELY.”24
Proper Notice of the Modified Terms Is Required for Consent to Be Effective
The concept of proper notice is implicit in the notion that the consumer must be given the
option to reject the newly revised CSA. After all, “[a]n offer may not be accepted until it is
made and brought to the attention of the one accepting.”25
Although courts have varying definitions for what constitutes proper notice, the concept
invariably revolves around whether a consumer would understand that a modification of the
original contract had occurred.26  This inquiry is intensely fact specific and often turns on small
details of timing, language, and physical particulars.
For example, Badie v. Bank of America turned on the language of the notification. The
California Court of Appeals held that the notice was deficient because of language in the
modification meant to obfuscate and downplay the binding nature of the arbitration.27  A
divided Maryland Court of Appeals similarly held that simply mailing an updated CSA without
noting that the CSA had been changed was not sufficient to achieve proper notice. In
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Mattingly, the appellant cable service amended its CSA and mailed it to the
appellee without calling attention to the changes.28  The court, noting the burden of
“meticulously comb[ing] through both documents line by line,” found that the modifications
were not binding absent notice intended to call the user’s attention to the changes in the
revised CSA.29
The components of the notification are also important. In Briceno v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., a
Florida court held that a notice in a monthly statement was sufficient to apprise a user of her
rights.30  The notice was titled “Important Notice Regarding Your PCS Service from Sprint,”
printed in bold lettering and placed immediately below the amount due.31  By contrast, in
Manasher v. NECC Telecom, a Michigan district court found that a notice on an invoice failed
to adequately incorporate by reference an online CSA.32  The notice failed, in part, because it
was the fifth item on the second page of the invoice and the print font was ordinary.33
Moreover, the language of the notice was faulty, as it merely informed consumers that NECC’s
“Disclosures and Liabilities Agreement” was available via the Web or an 800 number; the
changes also failed to state that the modification itself formed part of an agreement between
the parties, or that it was intended to be incorporated into the parties’ agreement.34
Although the Manasher Court did not find the service provider’s online CSA to be binding, other
courts have accepted notices that referred to web-delivered CSA modifications, provided that
reasonable notification and access are also provided.35  In Briceno, for example, the court
found that Sprint provided adequate notice when it prominently announced a change in terms
in the monthly bill, along with both a Web address and telephone number where the consumer
could access the revised CSA.36  Addtionally, in Crawford v. Talk America, Inc., the plaintiff
claimed that her long-distance provider failed to provide her with a copy of its CSA.37
Although the service provider did not supply the consumer with a copy of its CSA, it did send
her a written notice providing a Web address and a toll-free number where the plaintiff could
request a copy.38  The court found that Crawford knew where to obtain the terms, and going
online or making a phone call was not a real obstacle to access.39
As with the other cases, the service provider’s failure to affirmatively notify the consumer of
the change is the central issue in Douglas as well.
THE DOUGLAS DECISION
Joe Douglas contracted for long-distance service with America Online (“AOL”), which
subsequently sold its long distance telephone service, including the contract for Mr. Douglas’
service, to Talk America, Incorporated (“Talk America”).40  Talk America modified the CSA to
include an arbitration clause, a waiver of the right to bring a class-action , and other 3
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amendments.41  Also, it posted the revised terms on its Web site, but otherwise failed to notify
Douglas of the changes.42  Douglas continued to use Talk America’s service for four years after
the CSA revision,43  although there was some dispute as to whether Douglas utilized AOL or
Talk America’s Web site to set up an automatic monthly payment of his bill.44
The relationship between the parties soured, and Douglas filed a class-action suit against Talk
America alleging violation of the Federal Communication Act and various California consumer
protection statutes.45  The district court granted Talk America’s motion to compel arbitration
per the terms of its revised CSA.46  Douglas then petitioned the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which issued a writ of mandamus vacating the district court’s order compelling arbitration.47
The district court based its reasoning, in part, on the fact that Douglas may have paid his bills
on the same Web site that Talk America used to post its revised CSA.48  The Ninth Circuit
reversed.49  It found that, even if Douglas had used the site, simply posting the amended CSA
on the site failed to rise to the level of adequate notice.50  Douglas had no reason to look at
the contract posted there, as “parties to a contract have no obligation to check the terms on a
periodic basis to learn whether they have been changed by the other side.”51  Without having
reason to know of the change, the court suggests that, under Talk America’s system, Douglas
would be in the absurd position of having to “compare every word” of the posted CSA against
his own version in order to keep informed of his obligations on a daily basis.52  Indeed, the
lower court’s decision reflected a “fundamental misapplication[] of contract law” by upholding
the modified terms when Talk America had failed to properly notify Douglas.53
Moreover, the panel noted two other mistakes that militated issuing the writ of mandamus.
First, the trial court’s decision ignored California case law holding that service providers cannot
impose arbitration policies against existing customers.54  Second, the trial court failed to
consider whether the class action waiver included in the amended CSA would be
unconscionable under state law.55  While these factors are outside the scope of this article,
they serve as a reminder to contract drafters to be aware of the various state-based consumer
protection laws that could affect the validity of a CSA modification.
PROPER NOTICE AFTER DOUGLAS
Although using a Web site to amend a consumer service agreement may appear to be a cost
effective alternative to physical mailings, service providers should use this practice with
caution. Cases like Briceno v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. and Crawford v. Talk America, Inc. suggest
that providing easy access to a CSA through a Web site or telephone number is a viable way
of disseminating this information. But Douglas, like DIRECTV v. Mattingly before it, teaches
that mere access to the amended CSA is not enough. In both of those cases, the service
provider made the updated CSA easily accessible, yet failed to put consumers on notice that a
change had occurred.
Clearly, a post-Douglas service provider would be foolish to simply modify the CSA posted on
its Web site and do nothing more. It is well established that the service provider must give
consumers notice reasonably designed to apprise them of the changes in order for a change of
terms to be effective. Douglas, however, offers little insight into just how much more
notification is necessary. Would an email to consumers stating that the CSA terms have been
modified and containing links to the amended CSA posted on a service provider’s Web site be
sufficient? Does the email or the Web site have to identify the changes?
Cases like Briceno and Crawford that allowed contracts to be accessed via the Internet or by
telephone, suggest that the courts may be getting closer to allowing online notification of
contract amendments to CSA's. However, at least for the foreseeable future, the element of
proper notice will require that the service provider reach out to the consumer in some fashion
in order to put them on notice regarding the contract modification. Absent special
circumstances, simply posting an updated contract on a Web site will likely never be a valid
way for a service provider to notify its consumers of a change in the terms of an ongoing
consumer service agreement.
PRACTICE POINTERS
4
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When initially drafting a consumer service agreement (“CSA”), attorneys should
reference any terms (like dispute resolution) that the service provider may wish to
change at a later date. To make the change effective, the drafter should include a
right of the provider to modify the terms of the CSA.
At a minimum, service providers must alert their customers to a change in the
CSA. The best practice probably entails including the changes themselves in the
notice. If the changes themselves are not included in the notice, the notice must,
minimally, inform consumers as to where to find the changes. Furthermore, the
communications must provide consumers with a relatively hassle-free means of
accessing the revised CSA (e.g., by providing access through a Web address or toll-
free telephone number).
When determining if a service provider has given proper notice, courts will consider
the overall effect of the notice, including the use of clear language, the font type
and size, and the placement of the text within the larger body of the
communication itself.
The notice of contract modification should be accompanied by a procedure for
opting out of the agreement. This may be achieved by requiring consumers to quit
the service (preferably without a significant penalty) if they do not agree to the
modified CSA.
Proper notice is only one element of contract modification. Attorneys should also be
cognizant of relevant state consumer protection statutes and case law pertaining to
contract unconscionability.
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2. A 2007 study found that one in seven Americans carry 10 or more credit cards.
This number was up from one in nine in 2004. Marilyn Lewis, 1 in 7 Americans
Carry 10 or More Credit Cards, MSN MONEY, Feb. 14, 2007,
http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Banking/CreditCardSmarts/1In7AmericansCarries10CreditCards.aspx?
GT1=9113.
3. Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court, 495 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
4. See Perry v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 04-507, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12616, at
*5 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2004) (explaning that courts look to state contract law
regarding arbitration, even if the suit is based on federal consumer credit laws).
5. See Fedor v. Cingular Wireless Corp., 355 F.3d 1069, 1071-73 (7th Cir. 2004)
(explaining that, in the wireless industry, state law is preempted by federal
regulation only when the claim involves the court in ratemaking or market entry).
6. See DIRECTV v. Mattingly, 829 A.2d 626, 631 (Md. 2003) (explaining that the issue
of whether the terms of a satellite television contract are binding is predicated on
state contract law rather than federal law).
7. See Dreamscape Design, Inc. v. Affinity Network, Inc., 414 F.3d 665 (7th Cir.
2005) (holding that state law could not invalidate the terms and conditions of long-
distance contracts). However, the Dreamscape Court also recognized that
“Congress envisioned some role for state law after detariffing, so federal law no
longer completely preempts the entire field.” Id. at 673 (citing Boomer v. AT&T
Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 424 (7th Cir. 2002).
8. See generally Ting v. AT&T Corp., 319 F.3d 1126, 1130-33 (9th Cir. 2003)
(discussing detariffing).
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9. Id. at 1146 (holding that “state contract and consumer protection laws form part of
the framework for determining the rights, obligations and remedies of the parties
to a CSA.”).
10. Manasher v. NECC Telecom, No. 06-10749, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68795, at *32
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 18, 2007) (holding that contract formation issues must be
decided by state, rather than federal law); see also Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138
F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the FCA does not preempt state law
actions prohibiting deceptive business practices, false advertising, or common-law
fraud in a pre-detariffing case); see also In re Long Distance Telecommc’ns Litig.,
831 F.2d 627, 633 (6th Cir. 1987) (finding that charges of fraud do not require
agency expertise).
11. In re Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace
Implementation of Section 254(g) of the Communications Act of 1934, 12 FCC Rcd.
15014, 15057 (1997).
12. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); see also S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009)
(proposing amendments to Federal Arbitration Act).
13. See Ozormoor v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 08-11717, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58725,
at *6-8 (E.D. Mich. June 19, 2008) (discussing the relevance of federal arbitration
policies).
14. Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court, 495 F.3d 1062, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
15. Id. at 1067.
16. An example of the ubiquity of the ‘change of terms provision’ can be found in Badie
v. Bank of America, 67 Cal. App. 4th 779, 787 (1998), where the bank’s expert
witness testified that including such provisions had been “the standard industry
practice since bank credit cards first became available in the 1960’s.”
17. See, e.g., Perry v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 04-507, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12616, at *7-8, *16 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2004) (noting that if the plaintiffs had
continued to use their cards after receiving notice of the changes, “they would have
manifested their assent to the new term” and thus, presumably, the issue would
have been moot). The Perry Court also gives an overview of cases resolving this
issue. Id. at *7-8.
18. See Badie, 67 Cal. App. 4th at 799-801.
19. Delaware is one of the leading states for corporate law. See Edelist v. MBNA Am.
Bank, 790 A.2d 1249, 1257-58 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001) (analyzing Title 5 sec. 952 of
the Delaware Code, which allows banks to make extensive unilateral changes to
CSAs).
20. Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court, 495 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)
(“[A] revised contract is merely an offer and does not bind the parties until it is
accepted.”) (citing Matanuska Valley Farmers Cooperating Ass’n v. Monaghan, 188
F.2d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 1951)).
21. See RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 14:61 (3d ed. 1997).
22. While it is undoubtedly the safer legal choice, whether the service provider must
allow a consumer to reject a change without penalty may be an open question. See
Briceno v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 911 So. 2d 176, 180-81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(noting in dicta that the “enforcement of an early termination fee, coupled with
more onerous terms or amendments, could render an amendment unconscionable
and, thus, unenforceable.”).
23. Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 2002).
24. Id. at 415; see also Ozormoor v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 08-11717, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 58725, at *8 (E.D. Mich. June 19, 2008) (explaining that Ozormoor’s
receipt of a copy of the CSA and continued use of his wireless phone constituted
acceptance of the terms).
25. Douglas, 495 F.3d at 1066 (quoting Trimble v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 234 A.D. 427,
431 (N.Y. App. Div. 1932)). 6
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26. See, e.g., DIRECTV v. Mattingly, 829 A.2d 626, 636 (Md. 2003) (observing that
“proper notice” requires that the customer receive “enough information to make an
informed decision”); see also Briceno v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 911 So. 2d 176,
180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that consumer must be given “a fair and
clear warning of changes”); see also Badie v. Bank of Am., 67 Cal. App. 4th 779,
805 (1998) (explaining that notice must be designed to achieve “knowing
consent”).
27. Badie, 67 Cal. App. 4th at 805-06 (addressing a contract in which Bank of America
sought to add an alternate dispute resolution clause).
28. DIRECTV, 829 A.2d at 627-30.
29. Id. at 634. The dissent, however, argues that a reasonable consumer would be put
on notice of potential changes by a different effective date on the front page of the
newer CSA. Id. at 640-41.
30. Briceno v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 911 So.2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
31. Id. at 180.
32. Manasher v. NECC Telecom, No. 06-10749, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68795 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 18, 2007).
33. Id. at *10-14.
34. Compare Manasher, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68795 with Ozormoor v. T-Mobile USA,
Inc., No. 08-11717, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58725, at *2 (E.D. Mich. June 19, 2008)
(addressing the incorporation of the rules of arbitration association into the CSA by
giving notice with the following language: “INCORPORATED HEREIN BY THIS
REFERENCE” and additional information available through a toll-free phone number
or Web site).
35. See, e.g., Briceno v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 911 So.2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2005); see also Crawford v. Talk Am., Inc., No. 05-CV-0180-DRH, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23181 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 2005).
36. Briceno, 911 So.2d at 180.
37. Crawford, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23181.
38. Id. at *9.
39. Id. at *12-13. Although Crawford deals with a new CSA rather than a modification,
its analysis is still relevant to the topic at hand.
40. Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court, 495 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1065.
43. Id.
44. Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court, 495 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
45. Id. at 1065.
46. Id. at 1065.
47. Id. at 1069.
48. Douglas v. Talk Am., Inc., No. CV-06-3809-GAF, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97210, at
*6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2006).
49. Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court, 495 F.3d 1062, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
50. Id. at 1067.
51. Id. at 1066.
52. Id. at 1066 n.1.
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53. Id. at 1067.
54. Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court, 495 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
55. Id. at 1067-68.
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